

# **Applications of obfuscation to software and hardware systems**

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# Program obfuscation

is an efficient transformation  $O$  of a program  $P$  into an equivalent program  $P'$  such that  $P'$  is far less understandable than  $P$  (i.e.  $P'$  protects any secrets that may be built into and used by  $P$ ).

A **perfectly obfuscated program**  $P'$  should comply with a “virtual black box” property: any information that can be extracted from the text of  $P'$  can be also extracted from the input-output behavior of  $P'$ .

**Total obfuscation** is a transformation of a program  $P$  into an equivalent program  $P'$  such that one can't understand what  $P'$  is doing (i.e. one can't learn the **functionality** of  $P$  from the text of  $P'$ ).

This guarantees a designer of the program  $P$  against its usage by an adversary in any applications as well as reverse engineering.

**Weak obfuscation** is a transformation of a program  $P$  into an equivalent program  $P'$  such that anyone **even knowing the functionality** of  $P'$  can't understand **how**  $P'$  operates. This means that one can't extract any useful information about data structures, algorithm, constants, etc. used in  $P$  from the text of  $P'$  and its input-output behavior specification.

In this case  $P'$  may be used in applications but any purposeful modification of its code (reverse engineering, inserting malicious fragments, breaking watermarks, etc.) is impossible.

## The source paper:

W.Diffie, M.Hellman, *New Directions in Cryptography* (1976).

«A more practical approach to finding a pair of easily computed inverse algorithms  $E$  and  $D$ , such that  $D$  is hard to infer from  $E$ , makes use of the difficulty of analyzing programs in low level languages. Anyone who has tried to determine what operation is accomplished by someone else's machine language program knows that  $E$  itself (i.e. what  $E$  does) can be hard to infer from an algorithm for  $E$ . If the program were to be made purposefully confusing through the addition of unneeded variables and statements, then determining an inverse algorithm could be made very difficult.

Of course, E must be complicated enough to prevent its identification from input-output pairs.

Essentially what is required is a one-way compiler: one which takes an easily understood program written in a high level language and translates it into an incomprehensible program in some machine language. The compiler is one-way because it must be feasible to do the compilation, but infeasible to reverse the process.»

# Cryptography and Obfuscation

Cryptography:  $C = E(M)$

$C$  is a ciphertext of a plaintext  $M$ .

Obfuscation:  $P' = O(P)$

$P'$  is a “ciphertext” of a source code  $P$ .

**The main difference:**

An obfuscated program (“ciphertext”)  $P'$  has to be an executable program equivalent to  $P$ . Thus, obfuscation may be viewed as a semantic-preserving encryption of programs.

## Applications of obfuscation

- To protect programs against reverse engineering and illegal modifications
- To protect software from illegal usage at the stage of distribution (with the help of watermarks)
- To provide security of mobile agents in the hostile environment
- To provide secret computation on the encrypted data (homomorphic encryption)
- To transform symmetric-key encryption algorithms into public-key ones



# Theoretical Foundations of Program Obfuscation

The hardness of formal program analysis:  
undecidability of Halting Problem, Equivalence  
Problem, etc.

**Theorem** (Rice, 1953, Uspensky, 1954). Any  
non-trivial semantical property of computer  
programs is undecidable.

# Obfuscation techniques

- C. Collberg, C. Thomborson, D. Low [1997] (taxonomy of obfuscating transformations)
- Wang C., Hill J., Knight J. Davidson J. [2000] (obfuscation as static analysis obstruction)
- Chow S., Gu Y., Johnson H., Zakharov V. [2001] (obfuscation via implantation of hard problems into a program)
- C. Linn, S. Debray [2003] (obfuscation via disrupting static disassembly process)
- X. Zhuang, R. Gupta [2003] (obfuscation with the help of program slicing techniques).

# Formal definition of a perfect obfuscator

(B.Barak et al [2001])

A **perfect obfuscator** is a probabilistic algorithm  $O$  which satisfies the following three conditions:

**(functionality):** For every program  $\pi$  the string  $O(\pi)$  is a program that computes the same function as  $\pi$ .

**(polynomial slowdown) :** The size and running time of  $O(\pi)$  are at most polynomially larger than that of  $\pi$ .

**(virtual black box):** any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm  $A$  (adversary), which has an access to the text of  $O(\pi)$  could achieve no better results than some PPT algorithm  $S$  which has oracle access to  $\pi$  (i.e.  $S$  uses  $\pi$  as a black box).

## On the impossibility of “black-box” perfect obfuscators

**Theorem.** “Virtual black box” perfect obfuscators do not exist.

Barak B., Goldreich O., Impagliazzo R., Rudich S., Sahai A., Vadhan S, Yang K.,  
On the (Im)possibility of obfuscating programs. **CRYPTO'01 - Advances in Cryptology, LNCS, 2001, v.2139, p. 1-18.**

## On the impossibility of “gray box” perfect obfuscators

An obfuscator  $O$  is called **weakly perfect** if for any program  $\pi$  an obfuscated program  $O(\pi)$  has **virtual gray box** property, i.e. any PPT  $A$  which has an access to the text of  $O(\pi)$  could achieve no better results than some PPT algorithm  $S$  which has access to the set  $\mathbf{Tr}(\pi)$  of execution traces of program  $\pi$ .

**Theorem.** **Weakly perfect obfuscators do not exist.**

N.Varnovsky A note on the concept of obfuscation, Tech. Report of the Institute for System Programming, v. 6, 2004.

# On the possibility of provably secure obfuscating programs

**Theorem. Password checking scheme can be obfuscated securely.**

N. Varnovsky, V. Zakharov, On the possibility of provably secure obfuscating programs.  
2003, LNCS, v. 2890, p. 91-102 (ISP RAS)



B. Lynn, M. Prabhakaran, A. Sahai, Positive results and techniques for obfuscation.  
2004, LNCS, v. 3027, p. 20-39

# Computation on encrypted data

Given a program **A** choose a pair (E,D) of encoding and decoding algorithms and transform **A** into a program **B** such that

$$A(x) = D (B (E(x)))$$

holds for any input **x**



## Secure computations on encrypted data

**Theorem.** For any algebraic circuit **A** there exists an algebraic circuit **B** such that

1.  $\text{Size}(\mathbf{B}) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Size}(\mathbf{A})$
2. there are efficient encoding **E** of inputs and decoding **D** of outputs such that

$$\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{D}(\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{E})) \quad (*)$$

3. given a circuit **B** one can suggest exponentially many different circuits **A**, encodings **E** and decodings **D** satisfying (\*).

**A.V.Shokurov, An approach to quantitative analysis of resistance of data encodings in tamper-resistant software, Tech. Report of the Institute for System Programming v.6, 2004.**



## Directions for further theoretical research

1. Developing **refined definitions** of secure obfuscation (**obfuscation functionality, algorithms, constants**).
2. **Open Problem:**  
Is it possible to obfuscate securely finite state machines (automata)?
3. Challenge: to develop a formal concept of “semantic complexity” of programs (for measuring the complexity of program understanding).  
**Analogy:** Kolmogorov complexity

# Implementations

- There are more than 20 Java byte-code obfuscators, including commercial. The most advanced – Zelix KlassMaster ([www.zelix.com](http://www.zelix.com)). It performs the following transformations:
  - Removal of debugging information.
  - Identifier renaming in the whole program.
  - Character string encoding.
  - Insertion of redundant JVM GOTO instructions to make reverse translation to Java source harder.

# Taxonomy of Obfuscating Transformations

- Lexical obfuscation (comment removal, identifier renaming, structured construction removal, debugging info removal).
- Program control obfuscation.
- Program data obfuscation (string scrambling, array restructuring, etc).

C. Colberg et al. A Taxonomy of Obfuscating Transformations, 1997.

# Program Control Obfuscation

- **Restructuring of the whole program:**
  - Function inlining,
  - Function outlining,
  - Function interleaving,
  - Function cloning,
  - Library calls elimination.
- **Transformation of a single function:**
  - «opaque» predicates, redundant code, «dead» code, use of identities,
  - Destructurization,
  - Basic block cloning,
  - Loop unrolling,
  - Loop fusion, loop fission, loop interleaving,
  - Creation of «dispatcher»,
  - Variable localization, variable globalization, variable reuse,
  - Increasing indirect level.

# Example of lexical obfuscation

```
int fib(int n) {
    int a, b, c;
    a = 1;
    b = 1;
    if (n <= 1) return
    1;
    for (; n > 1; n--) {
        c = a + b;
        a = b;
        b = c;
    }
    return c;
}
```

```
int f1(int r0) {
    int r1, r2, r3;
    r1 = 1;
    r2 = 1;
    if (r0 > 1) goto L22;
    return 1;
L22: if (r0 <= 1)
    goto L23;
    r3 = (r1 + r2);
    r1 = r2;
    r2 = r3;
    r0--;
    goto L22;
L23: return r3;
}
```

# How to measure the effect of transformation?

- Security of practical obfuscation techniques is in most cases cannot be proved.
- To estimate the effect of transformation Code Complexity metrics are used (Code Length, Cyclomatic Complexity, Fan In/Out Complexity, etc).
- **An adequate theoretical basis currently does not exist.**

# Practical obfuscation study at ISP RAS

- The research is empiric, thus a programming environment to study analysis and transformation of programs is needed.


## **Requirements for an Integrated Research Environment (IRE)**

- Support for all the primary program analysis and optimization methods.
- Support for all primary program obfuscation methods.
- Open interface: possibility to add a new analysis or obfuscation method.

# Uses of the IRE

- Research of program optimization methods (parallelizing, profile-based optimizations, etc).
- Study of program obfuscation and analysis of obfuscated programs.
- As a tool for detection of security vulnerabilities and malicious code (in perspective).





# IRE User Interface

The screenshot displays the IRE user interface with the following components:

- Menu Bar:** File, Analyze, Optimize, Transform, Obfuscate, Generate, Execute, Visualize, Traces, Options, Windows, Help.
- Source Code Editor:** Shows the implementation of a Fibonacci function:
 

```
int fib(int n)
{
    int a, b, c;

    a = 1;
    b = 1;
    if (n <= 1) return 1;
    for (; n > 1; n--) {
        c = a + b;
        a = b;
        b = c;
    }
    return c;
}

int main()
{
    int i;
```
- Transform Menu:**
  - Duplicate MIF
  - Edge splitting
  - Remove INCR
  - Remove dead code
  - Clean up unused objects
  - Remove generations
  - Rename variables
- Control flow graph of fib:** A graph with nodes 0 through 6. Node 0 is the entry point, leading to node 2. Node 2 branches to nodes 3 and 4. Node 4 branches to nodes 5 and 6. Node 5 has a self-loop. Nodes 3, 5, and 6 all lead to node 1, which is the exit point.
- Code metrics table:**

Function name	Size complexity	Cyclomatic complexity	Fan complexity	Cal comple
fib	12	3	3	0
main	13	2	1	1
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>


# Analyzing/optimization tools

- Inter/intra-procedural alias and range analysis.
- Program dependency analysis.
- Constant/copy propagation, dead code elimination, common subexpression elimination, invariant code motion.
- Basic block node/edge profiling, tracing, control-flow graph recovery.

# Obfuscation tools

- Identifier renaming, structure elimination.
- Dispatcher construction.
- Static and tracing-resistant obfuscation based on control-flow transformation (PhD thesis, 2003, A. Chernov).
- Obfuscation using cryptography primitives (MSc thesis, ISP RAS 2004, A. Lokhmotov).

# Dispatcher transformation



# Dispatcher table encoding

- A method is developed, which uses one-way functions and pseudo-random generators.
- The method has provable cryptographic resistance against program static analysis.
- One-way function and pseudorandom functions are based on knapsack problem:

$$f_a(x) = \sum_i x_i a_i \text{ mod } 2^m,$$


$$x = (x_1 x_2 \dots x_n), x_i \in \{0,1\}; a = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n), a_i \in \{0,1\}^m$$

# Resistance against profile-based analysis

- Increase the complexity of the CFG by adding new edges. The added edges are not “dead”.
- Increase the data complexity by generating dummy code and its environment.
- Stop data-flow analysis methods by adding “false” data dependencies between the dummy and the original code.

**A. Chernov. A New Program Obfuscation Method. In *Proceedings of the Adrei Ershov Fifth International Conference “Perspectives of Systems Informatics”*. International Workshop on Program Understanding, Novosibirsk, July 14-16, 2003.**

# Basic block cloning





# Obfuscating functions in hardware

- The goal of hardware obfuscation is to protect secret information in circuit design.
- Financial/military applications.